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1 Introduction
Currently, much of Asia and South-East Asia is
growing at an impressive rate. China is growing
particularly fast, as more recently are some of the
low-income countries, such as Vietnam, Cambodia
and Laos. This is allowing a very large reduction in
poverty in these countries. Dynamism in Asia also
plays a major role in facilitating growth in the rest of
the developing world, and therefore increases
poverty reduction there.
One of the potential risks that could undermine
continued rapid growth in East Asia would be a
financial crisis, particularly if it spread throughout
the region. As discussed in the introduction, the
financial – and most importantly – the development
costs of crises are extremely high. Indeed, even
today, ten years after the East Asian crisis, crisis-hit
countries, though growing fast, are still growing
less than they did before 1997 and their investment
rates are quite significantly below their pre-crisis
levels.
The articles in this IDS Bulletin (see, e.g. Park and
Wyplosz) show that the risk of financial crisis on
the whole seems to have diminished quite
significantly in the region; this is both because of
national efforts at improving financial sectors and
their regulation, strengthening macroeconomic
fundamentals (although it is always good to
remember that rather good fundamentals
characterised East Asia before the crisis) and –
perhaps above all – very large foreign exchange
reserves countries have been able to accumulate, in
relation to short-term debt.
However, although national efforts have been very
important in East Asia, new risks and threats seem
to come from the international economy.
As pointed out in the Introduction, the uncertainties
posed by the risk of an abrupt unravelling of global
imbalances, or of sharply rising oil prices, may
drastically change the prospect for East Asia.
Increased dependence of these countries on export-
led strategies may have created more vulnerability to
trade cycles. Though attempts by the IMF to
strengthen its multilateral surveillance by interacting
with major actors, including in the developed world,
is a step in the right direction for encouraging
reduction of imbalances, it is unclear how effective
such efforts will be. Furthermore, the legitimacy and
effectiveness of the IMF is weakened by its
governance structure, which has been only very
partially and insufficiently modified.
Furthermore, relatively little progress has been made
on reform of the international financial architecture,
both for preventing and better managing crises as
enthusiasm for such reforms have weakened among
developed countries. For example, progress has been
very slow towards the creation of an IMF
precautionary financial arrangement that would
effectively provide rapid and non-conditional liquidity
to countries with good macro-fundamentals
threatened by a self-fulfilling crisis. There have been
ample discussions and studies after the Contingent
Credit Line was discontinued but, as yet, no action
(see, e.g. Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2006). Similarly,
progress on international mechanisms for orderly
debt restructuring have stalled, even though some
more limited positive steps have been taken, such as
introducing collective action clauses into bonds issued
by a number of countries, including in East Asia.
International financial regulation has hardly advanced
to tackle, for example, speculative activities of highly
leveraged institutions, which could pose some serious
threats for financial stability (for more detailed
discussion on these issues, see Stiglitz et al. 2006).
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Of significance, particularly in East Asia, are regional
initiatives. These are potentially particularly important
due to slow progress on reform of international
financial governance. As Park et al. (2006) discusses,
there are three pillars essential for regional financial
and monetary coordination – liquidity assistance,
monitoring and surveillance, and exchange rate
coordination. Perhaps the most important progress has
been made in the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which
would provide liquidity to assist countries threatened by
crises. This is an important step. However, CMI
currently has restrictions which may quite significantly
limit its effectiveness, such as the fact that any country
requiring short-term liquidity must negotiate its
activation with all swap-providing countries individually,
as the commitments are bilateral, instead of
multilateral. Exchange rate coordination is also an
important issue, on which there is much discussion in
the region but, as yet, no concrete action – which is
understandable given the complexities involved.
1.1 New policy challenges
A new policy challenge is posed by the explosive
growth of derivatives. Derivatives instruments are
used by companies and other actors to hedge net
exposures, such as in foreign exchange. For example,
importers and exporters hedge their foreign
exchange exposure so that their costs or revenues
become less volatile. Similarly, firms borrowing in
foreign currency can hedge the value of their debt
payments. This can be very valuable for the firms.
However, problems can arise if large corporations
(usually foreign investors) have net foreign exchange
exposure and do not fully hedge it, which is called
here ‘passive speculation’. This can happen because a
large part of their debt is in foreign currency and
their income is in local currency (e.g. telecoms). The
problem is that when downward pressure emerges
on the local currency, such companies may rapidly
hedge their net foreign exchange exposure. As we
will discuss below, regulatory measures could be
designed to avoid such ‘passive speculation’, for
example, by ensuring that large corporations with
significant net foreign exchange exposure are fully
hedged. This could have positive effects both for the
firm and from a macroeconomic perspective.
More open speculation occurs when international –
and national – hedge funds (HFs) or investment
banks (IBs) – often based off-shore or operating
through special purpose branches within countries –
speculate on developing country currencies via the
carry trade. A recent example is the carry trade
between the Chilean peso and the Brazilian real
where the basic idea is to capture the substantive
differential between these currencies’ interest rates
via derivatives; however, when exchange rates start
changing, this carry trade can be very rapidly
unwound, with large changes in exchange rates
beyond that warranted by fundamentals (Dodd and
Griffith-Jones 2006). Such carry trade is of course
particularly important with the yen and may be
involving a number of emerging economies in East
Asia with potentially destabilising impacts on their
currencies and economies.
The challenge for regulating such transactions is a
difficult one, given that they occur off-shore and
occur OTC (over the counter) – that is outside the
exchanges and use synthetic instruments such as
non-deliverable forwards (NDFs). We return to these
new and complex challenges below.
As pointed out above, there has been progress at
the national level to reduce financial vulnerability.
Progress on international financial architecture, on
the other hand, is insufficient; regionally, there is
encouraging but not sufficient progress.
Furthermore, new policy challenges arise, such as
how to respond to a possible slowdown in the world
economy. In this article, we will focus on additional
new specific areas that East Asian countries need to
focus on: (a) the challenges of introducing Basel II
and avoiding negative effects, (b) the potential for
using new instruments, such as GDP-linked bonds,
to reduce risks of crises and help protect growth in
slowdowns, and (c) new risks, such as the potential
vulnerabilities arising from derivatives instruments
and their explosive growth globally.
2 The policy challenges
Many of the broad policy challenges for financial and
macroeconomic stability have been rightly focussed
in recent years on sustainability, including in external
and fiscal accounts, as well as in the financial sector.
There is an additional dimension in the procyclical
bias of financial markets (both international and
domestic) and of business cycles (Borio and White
2004; Goodhart 2004; Griffith-Jones and Ocampo
2006). Indeed, ‘excessive procyclicality’ has been
identified by BIS and IMF officials as ‘those
fluctuations that cause some combination of
unnecessary amplifications of the real economy and
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damage to the soundness of the financial system’
(Gerlach and Gruenwald 2006). To avoid this
excessive procyclicality, the emphasis on sustainability
(which East Asian countries have, on the whole,
followed very successfully in the last decade) should
be accompanied by an emphasis on countercyclical
dimensions of financial policies. This includes: (a)
helping smooth out boom–bust cycles through
regulation, (b) designing market borrowing
mechanisms that better distribute cyclical risks faced
by developing countries, such as local currency and
GDP-indexed bonds, and (c) manage new risks, such
as those posed by derivatives.
2.1 Challenges for banking stability
The financial systems in East Asia have undergone
major changes since the 1997–8 financial crisis.
Increased degree of diversification and deepening
has taken place, evidenced by significant growth of
assets as a proportion of GDP, especially in the
equity and bond markets. The banking systems across
Asia have gone through an ample process of re-
capitalisation, consolidation and growing presence of
foreign banks. As mentioned above, the financial
indicators for the banking systems have improved
significantly, with non-performing loan (NPL) ratios
nowadays in single digits, the ratio of operating costs
to total assets declining, thus showing increased
efficiency, and relatively higher profitability (Ghosh
2006). However, some countries still have important
weaknesses (in this IDS Bulletin).
Prudential banking regulation and supervision have
been strengthened in the region, with greater
adherence to the Basel Core Principles for Banking
Supervision (BCP) and higher capital adequacy ratios
across-the-board under the Basel Capital Accord
(Basel I).
However, as the banking systems in Asia become
increasingly integrated with the international
financial markets, traditional financial indicators may
not be sufficient to capture potential sources of risks
facing the financial system. It is important that a
more dynamic regulatory approach is adopted to
appropriately address the emerging issues associated
with the implementation of Basel II in the region
(financial systems are inherently procyclical and Basel
II may accentuate that), and the inter-linkages
between key macroeconomic variables – which can
exhibit sharp variations as a result of rapidly changing
international conditions – and the financial system.
Basel II
Most Asian countries intend to implement Basel II at
some point in the coming years. Indeed, a survey
from the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) of the BIS
shows that all Asian respondents (16 in total) to the
survey expressed the intention to adopt the new
capital framework (FSI 2006). These intentions,
which may actually result in a slower than initially
predicted implementation process, should be seen as
a positive development, as Basel II has the important
purpose of further strengthening the soundness and
stability of the international banking system, through
encouraging banks to improve their risk
management practices, incorporating new risks into
allocation of capital and enhancing transparency.
But Basel II also introduces a number of issues that
were not present under Basel I. A key issue is the
fact that, by encouraging banks to adopt risk
sensitive models for determining capital charges, it
may reinforce the procyclical behaviour of the
banking sector. These models, to be used by banks
adopting the internal rating based (IRB) and the
advanced (A-IRB) approaches, will tend to increase
the measured probability of default during economic
downturns. As a consequence, the assets of a
portfolio will be downgraded, which in turn will lead
to higher capital charges. This concern has been
expressed by policymakers and academics alike (see
Global Risk Regulator 2007).
Recent empirical research supports the claim that
the use of the IRB approach to measure risk may
cause higher variation in the capital charge over the
business cycle, as compared with the Basel I types of
rules for measuring risk (Goodhart and Segoviano
2004; Gordy and Howells 2004; Kashyap and Stein
2004). This in itself may lead to both increased cost
and reduced quantity of credit. Furthermore, the fact
that it is harder to increase capital during economic
downturns may reinforce the tendency in credit
reduction, ultimately leading to a credit crunch and a
deepening of the economic downturn, with further
impacts on banks’ portfolios. Thus, there is a tension
between micro- and macro-prudential regulation
objectives in that what may be good for an individual
bank may turn out to be bad for the economy as a
whole, with possible implications for systemic risk.
A reason why the measured risk by these models
tends to be so much time-variant is that even when
they are forward-looking, their time horizons are
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often limited to one year (Borio et al. 2003). These
models therefore result in assigning borrowers ratings
in light of their current (or over a limited time-
horizon) default status – what is called the ‘point-in-
time’ approach. But if models could instead look
‘through-the-cycle’, so as to reduce or eliminate
variations in the ratings caused by changing conditions
during the cycle, then their procyclicality effects could
be avoided or at least significantly reduced (Borio et
al. 2003). It would be thus advisable that country
regulators encourage banks to use through-the-cycle
models. However, banks generally use a point-in-time
approach due to lack of data on default data over
longer periods (Craig et al. 2006). Thus, adoption of
through-the-cycle models by a large number of banks
may take a long time.
In the meantime, to effectively compensate for the
procyclical bias in Basel II, it is crucial that regulators
incorporate countercyclical elements into prudential
regulation and supervision. In this regard, the
adoption of forward-looking dynamic provisioning
would be highly appropriate. Under this system,
provisions are made when loans are disbursed based
on expected losses. It thus addresses ‘latent’ risks,
which are estimated for homogeneous categories of
credit, on the basis of a full business cycle (Griffith-
Jones and Ocampo 2006; Fernández de Lis et al.
2001). In this way, provisions build up during
economic expansions to be drawn upon during
downturns. However, where provisioning meets
obstacles from the accounting profession (often
accountants do not like the fact that, as a result of
ex-ante provisioning the value of loans on the
balance sheets is less than their face value), counter-
cyclical capital requirements could be considered
instead, to ensure that banks have a capital buffer to
be used in bad times (Lowe and Stevens 2006).
Moreover, forward-looking provisioning, or
alternatively countercyclical capital, could be
complemented with other countercyclical prudential
regulation. These could address, for example,
excessive growth of credit relative to some
benchmark, and the bias in lending to sectors
characterised by systematic risks, such as mortgages.
Most Asian large banks intend to adopt one of the
two Basel proposed IRB approaches (Fitch Ratings
2005); moreover, most regulators in the region –
88 per cent of the respondents of the FSI survey
mentioned earlier – plan to grant permission to
banks for the use of the IRB approach (and 63 per
cent the A-IRB approach) at some point within the
2007–15 timeframe (FSI 2006). Thus, the risk that
procyclicality in Asia’s financial systems increases in
the coming years as a result of the use of the IRB
approaches, is concrete. This is a development that
should be avoided for the sake of the economies of
the region, already subjected to volatile behaviour
due to external and other shocks, and for the
stability of the banking systems, which are also
affected by volatile macroeconomic variables.
The standardised approach, which is the alternative to
the IRB approaches, may also lead to increased
procyclicality in bank credit, if risk weights for
different types of assets are determined by external
rating agencies. This is because, as observed by Taylor
and Goodhart (2006), although their ratings are fairly
stable, they tend to be adjusted quite strongly to
changing conditions of the borrower, and to
overreact positively with the economic cycle.
However, country regulators have the option of
adopting a simplified version of the standardised
approach, especially in countries where the coverage
of rating agencies is very limited. Under this
approach, fixed weights are used, and are determined
by the regulator. This option would help address the
issue of procyclicality in Basel II, as in this case risk-
weights would not be time variant. This is an option
particularly appropriate for low-income countries.
Against these potentially worrying developments, it
should be noted that many Asian countries have
capital adequacy ratios (CARs) well above the
minimum required by Basel (Table 1), which can serve
as a capital buffer to help dampen procyclicality. But it
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Table 1 Total 2004 capital adequacy in selected
Asian countries
Country (%)
Indonesia 19.4
Philippines 18.6
Singapore 16.3
Hong Kong 15.4
Malaysia 14.2
Thailand 12.6
Korea 12.1
Taiwan 10.7
Source Moody’s (2005), based on bank regulators in
each country.
is not certain that this is the case in all Asia, especially
in countries with weaker and weakly regulated
banking systems; moreover, it is likely that even where
CARs are well above the minimum regulatory capital,
variations in regulatory capital requirements over the
business cycle are followed by variations in actual
capital (Taylor and Goodhart 2006).
As regards the impact of variations in actual capital
over the business cycle on the real economy, the
evidence is that when US banks adopted Basel I in
the early 1990s, banks’ portfolios moved towards less
risky assets to meet the minimum capital
requirements (Van Roy 2005; Berger and Udell
1994), and this may have had an impact on credit
provision to the real sector (Goodhart et al. 2004).1
Of course, it is difficult to gauge the impact of credit
decline on the US economy in the early 1990s
because firms may have resorted to other forms of
finance, which may have been made available given
the degree of diversification of the US financial
system. A credit reduction is more likely to have a
bigger effect on the real economy of countries
where the banking sector dominates as the main
source of capital, as is the case in Asia, given the lack
of alternative forms of finance (Jackson et al. 1999).
In addition to the role Basel II may play in reinforcing
procyclicality, it is equally important that in order to
support growth on a sustainable and equitable basis,
Basel II does not induce banks to skew credit away
from the corporate sector in favour of retail credit
too strongly, which is a trend that is already
emerging in Asia, even before the adoption of Basel
II. And that credit allocation within the corporate
sector does not end up in credit portfolio
concentration. This is because the use of risk-
sensitive models to determine capital charges for
different corporates may result in both more
expensive and rationed credit to borrowers perceived
as of higher risk, and more and cheaper credit to
borrowers perceived as of lower risk. For reasons
such as asymmetry of information and some biases in
Basel II that reinforce it, small borrowers such as
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are likely
to be judged as of higher risk than the larger ones,
such as large companies. In addition to creating
equity issues, this possible pattern in credit allocation
implies risk concentration, thereby making financial
institutions more vulnerable to shocks and
unexpected changing circumstances. This goes
against the intended objective of regulatory
measures, which is to reduce risks and vulnerabilities
to which banks are normally exposed.
Apart from the challenges that Basel II will pose to the
banking systems in Asia, particularly in terms of
increased procyclicality, there is the challenge for the
region’s supervisors of how to supervise the banks
adopting these more advanced approaches. At present,
Asia’s supervisors lack the resources and technical skills
needed for an effective supervision of the more
complex options (Fitch Report 2005). Indeed this is a
problem even in developed countries. In light of this, it
is advisable that implementation of Basel II is pursued in
a gradual fashion, with emphasis initially on
implementing Pillars II and III, and the adoption of the
standardised approach under Pillar I, before moving on
the more sophisticated, risk-based approaches.
The avoidance of new sources of procyclicality is
important, particularly in Asia where specific features
in the region’s financial systems have contributed to a
procyclical behaviour in the system. A crucial one has
been the use of extensive reliance on collateral – e.g.
property – by banks in their lending operations,
which has been pointed out as reinforcing financial
procyclicality in the region. This happens because
asset prices, whose underlying assets are used as
collaterals, increase strongly during upturns thereby
pushing up the value of collaterals. This, in turn, fuels
expansion of credit. However, while the use of
collaterals contributes to over-expansion of credit in
upturns, in downturns the fall in asset prices
reinforces credit contraction. Moreover, as banks
attempt to liquidate assets in response to losses,
asset prices decline even further opening up new
fronts of credit exposures (Craig et al. 2006: 70).
It is therefore crucial that measures are taken to
reduce the excessive use of collaterals, so that one
can weaken the mechanism through which asset
prices bubbles and busts can fuel credit expansion
and contraction. This would encourage banks to rely
on risk assessment as key criteria for lending. In that
regard, it would be desirable that borrowers’ credit
risk is assessed over the longer term, to avoid under-
pricing of lending, which happens when credit risk is
assessed over the short term. An alternative is to
lower the ratio of loans to collateral assets during
booms. Finally, as suggested earlier, forward-looking
provisioning should be implemented to dampen
financial procyclicality, as banks would have a buffer
to use when losses materialise in downturns.
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Inter-linkages between macroeconomic variables and
the financial sector
The financial crisis of 1997/8 has shown too well the
risks arising from the inter-linkages between
macroeconomic variables and the financial sector.
These inter-linkages imply market risks for the
financial sector, arising from sharp variations mainly
from interest and exchange rates. These risks are all
the more important where large maturity and
currency mismatches exist, for example in the
balance sheets of the banking sector, and between
the banking sector and the rest of the economy.
In response to the effects that sharp variations in key
macroeconomic variables, such as interest rates and
especially the exchange rate had on the banking
systems in Asia during the 1997/8 crisis, the countries
have made strides in enhancing prudential regulation.
However, every country should ensure that specific
regulatory measures to reduce possible mismatches in
the economy are in place. For example, restrictions
on banks’ open foreign-currency positions and even
strict prohibition of currency mismatches in their
portfolios should be adopted. Forbidding banks from
holding currency mismatches in their portfolios may,
however, encourage non-financial agents to borrow
directly from abroad. This is worrying if borrowers are
operating in non-tradable sectors. In this case,
additional prudential regulation is warranted, for
example in the form of quantitative limits for external
borrowing by firms that generate their revenues in
domestic currency. In any case, regulators should
closely monitor the currency risk of non-financial
firms operating in non-tradable sectors, which may
eventually become credit risks for banks (Griffith-
Jones and Ocampo 2006).
Currency mismatches is an important issue for
emerging Asian countries, which have nowadays
fairly liberalised capital accounts. But even among
low-income countries in the region where extensive
capital restrictions remain, it is possible to find a
number of countries where mismatches, especially
currency ones, are a serious problem. This is the case
because these countries are fairly (in a few cases
highly) ‘dollarised’. Typically, such low-income
countries attract large aid flows as a proportion of
their GDP, and permit dollar-denominated bank
accounts. The counterpart of these deposit liabilities
is that banks tend to lend in dollars to avoid currency
mismatches. However, lending may be channelled
not only to exporting firms but also to firms that
generate revenues in domestic currency. This leaves
banks vulnerable due to the credit risk that may arise
from exchange rate adjustments, as it can affect the
borrower’s ability to honour their debt. The major
challenge for these countries is to be able to find
ways to de-dollarise the economy as economic
growth and financial development takes place, and
as they become less dependent on aid flows. That is
an area where Latin America offers successful
lessons of de-dollarisation.
2.2 New market instrument opportunities
There is, at present, an opportunity for developing
countries to design and issue instruments that can
better diversify risks they face mainly due to their
increasing insertion in the world economy (especially
of a cyclical nature) than with traditional external debt.
High international liquidity and continued significant
appetite for emerging countries’ risk facilitates issuing
such instruments amongst foreign investors.
Additionally, in the case of East Asia, high domestic
savings could make issuing local currency bonds on
local markets easier as these markets have grown
significantly in the last decade – even though they
are still restricted mainly to government bonds and
the highest quality corporates. Increasing the
proportion of debt issued in local currency is a
valuable defence against currency mismatches that
contributed so much to cause or deepen currency
and debt crises in Asia in 1997/8. Furthermore, the
development of domestic capital markets creates a
more stable source of local funding for both the
public and private sectors.
There has been significant progress in issuing local
currency debt by developing countries, including in East
Asia. This debt has been mainly brought by local
investors. There is also growing interest in local
currency denominated bonds by international investors.
Innovative proposals have been advanced to make
local currency investments more attractive on a
stable basis by international investors. Dodd and
Spiegel (2005) have suggested raising capital in
international markets by forming diversified
portfolios of emerging market local currency debt
issued by sovereign Governments. These portfolios
would – by using risk management techniques of
diversification – generate a return-to-risk that
competed favourably with other major capital market
security indices, including those of major US and
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European securities indices in international capital
markets.
The World Bank and the regional development
banks could also design pilot projects of diversified
local currency bond issues that could encourage
private agents to emulate them. Indeed, the second
Asian Bond Fund (ABF2) launched in December
2004 by the 11 EMEAPs (Executives’ Meeting of East
Asia-Pacific Central Banks) is a pilot project of this
type with great potential value. All central banks
invested in bonds denominated in domestic
currencies of the eight EMEAP emerging
economies2 (Park et al. 2006).
GDP-linked bonds
There has been increasing interest in creating bonds
linked to the growth of a countries’ GDP. Their
servicing would be higher in times of rapid growth
and lower when growth was slow or negative. At
the 2006 spring meetings of the IMF and the World
Bank, both potential issuers and investors expressed a
clear appetite for such bonds. Furthermore, a number
of economists, such as Robert Shiller, John
Williamson and Kristin Forbes have favoured the issue
of securities whose servicing was linked to growth.
GDP-linked bonds would have important advantages
when compared with conventional debt for
borrowers and investors, as well as significant
externalities for the international financial system
(Griffith-Jones and Sharma 2006). For borrowers,
issuing such bonds would help stabilise public spending
throughout the cycle, as governments would service
more debt when they could better afford to, and less
in more difficult times. This would provide space for
higher government spending or lower taxes during
slowdowns or crises. It would also curb expansionary
policy in times of rapid growth. Issuing these bonds
would also significantly reduce the likelihood of costly
and disruptive defaults and debt crises. A temporary
reduction of a country’s debt service when the
economy deteriorates would facilitate a more rapid
and greater recovery. Simulations show that gains for
borrowing countries may be substantial in bad times;
Borensztein and Mauro (2004) show that if Mexico
had half of its government debt as GDP-indexed
bonds, it would have saved about 1.6 per cent during
the crisis of 1995.
For investors, defaults are costly as they result in
expensive renegotiation and sometimes in very large
losses. As GDP-linked bonds would help reduce the
probability of default, effective total payments will
tend to be higher than with conventional bonds.
Furthermore, GDP-linked bonds would give
investors the opportunity of taking a position on a
range of countries’ growth rates, offering a valuable
diversification opportunity. If GDP-linked bonds
became widespread across countries, investors could
take a position on growth worldwide – the ultimate
risk diversification.
For international institutions, there would be
benefits from the decreased likelihood of debt crises.
Reduced risk of crisis contagion would also benefit
other countries. These externalities and the fact that
financial innovations are difficult to introduce justify
some initial public action (e.g. from the World Bank
or regional development banks), to help develop this
market instrument. The World Bank or the Asian
Development Bank could, for instance, make loans to
several developing countries whose servicing would
be linked to GDP. The loans could then be grouped,
securitised and sold to the financial markets.
Furthermore, the second Asian Bond Fund (ABF 2)
could include GDP-linked paper in its portfolio.
GDP-linked bonds should be a core element of
government financing both for developed and
creditworthy developing countries. Developed
countries are the best equipped to issue GDP-linked
bonds immediately, because of the relatively high
trust that is placed in their capital markets and in
their GDP accounting. Their doing so would have a
valuable demonstration effect around the world.
Developing countries stand to gain more from issuing
these bonds as their GDP tends to be more volatile.
The issuance of even small quantities of these bonds
by creditworthy emerging economies would help set
in motion an important process of financial
development. Indeed, it would be very helpful for
the development of a GDP-linked bond market if
several governments (preferably both developed and
developing) started issuing such bonds simultaneously.
Institutions like IDA or the Asian Development Bank
could also consider lending in a GDP-linked manner to
low-income countries – countries that are particularly
vulnerable to external shocks. Furthermore,
slowdowns of growth or – even worse – declines of
GDP can cause particularly severe damage to poor
people’s welfare in low-income countries.
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The history of financial innovation is essentially one
of learning by doing. Inflation-indexed bonds met
initial scepticism, relating to problems such as precise
measurement of inflation. In fact, once these bonds
started to be issued, inflation statistics improved
further. Inflation-indexed bonds are now widely
accepted across the world; in the UK, they represent
around one-quarter of government debt. A similar
evolution can be envisaged for GDP-linked bonds.
Introducing GDP-linked bonds would create a market
for the economies themselves. The widespread
impression that the stock market of a country is a
market for the entire economy is mistaken. Stock
markets are claims on net corporate profits that can
constitute as little as 10 per cent of GDP.
GDP bonds seem very well suited for Islamic investors,
as the fact that they are like a stock instrument implies
the sharing of risk between investors and issuers,
rather than the payment of interest; they would
therefore seem to be Sharia compliant bonds as they
seem naturally consistent with the philosophy of
Sharia law. Islamic finance could be initially specifically
relevant for Muslim countries in East Asia such as
Indonesia and Malaysia. Furthermore, Malaysia is
reportedly (Financial Times, 6 February 2007) seeking
to become the biggest Islamic banking centre in East
Asia and created the world’s largest Islamic bond
market. It could therefore, potentially play a major role
in helping create a market for GDP-linked
instruments. Though this could be of special interest –
above all initially – to Islamic issuers and investors, once
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Table 2 Derivative products
China Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Hong Kong Singapore
(China)
Index
Futures N Y Y Y N N Y Y
Options N N Y Y N N Y Y
Options on futures N N N N N N N Y
Stock
Futures N N N N N N Y Y
Options N N Y N N N N N
Currency
Futures N Y Y N N N N N
Options N N Y N N N N N
Interest-rate
Futures N N Y Y N N Y Y
Options on futures N N N N N N N Y
Bonds
Futures N N Y Y N N Y Y
Options on futures N N Y N N N N Y
Commodities
Futures Y Y Y Y N N N Y
Options on futures N N N N N N N N
No. of products traded 1 3 9 5 0 0 6 9
Notes China: Zhengzhou and Dalian Commodity Exchange and Shanghai Futures Exchange.  Indonesia:
Jakarta Futures Exchange and Surabaya Stock Exchange.  Korea: Korea Stock Exchange and Korea Futures
Exchange.  Malaysia: Malaysia Derivatives Exchange. Philippines: Manila International Futures Exchange was
closed.  Singapore: SGX-DT.  Thailand Futures Exchange plans to open in 2006.
Source East Asian Finance: The Road to Robust Markets (Ghosh 2006), reproduced with permission from the
World Bank.
a market developed, it could become valuable for non-
Muslim developing issuer countries and investors.
GDP-linked bonds could take a couple of forms.
Simplest is a perpetual bond that pays a share, say a
trillionth, of GDP, at regular intervals to the bond
holders. Creating such a form would be analogous to
listing a country on a market as if it were a stock and
would yield the most transparent price discovery. This
may be the most appropriate modality for Islamic
financiers as servicing would not imply any interest
payment. Another form that may be easier to
introduce for non-Muslim investors is a conventional
bond that pays a coupon tied by a formula to growth
rates of GDP, but guarantees a minimum level of
debt servicing, even if the economy stops growing.
Whichever way they are created, GDP-indexed
bonds would have important advantages for different
actors. The moment is particularly favourable.
Investor appetite for emerging countries’ risk
continues to be strong. Investors’ experience with
Argentine GDP-warrants, issued as part of their
debt restructuring, has been very positive for them:
their price has been rising significantly. The time
seems ideal for one or more creditworthy countries
to start issuing GDP-linked bonds and for investors
to buy them. Any country whose growth slows
significantly would be thankful afterwards that they
bought the insurance such bonds represent.
Occasional recent instability is showing yet again the
value of insurance against economic fluctuations.
2.3 New policy challenges
At another level, completely new sources of
potential financial vulnerability have emerged,
particularly related to the explosive growth of
derivatives worldwide. Fairly recently, derivatives have
become increasingly important in developing
economies, including in East Asia.
According to the World Bank report on East Asian
Finance (Ghosh 2006), derivatives markets in East
Asia have accounted for a sizeable proportion of the
global growth in derivatives. Five main derivative
products are traded in East Asia: (a) foreign exchange
products, traded mostly in Hong Kong, Singapore
and Hong Kong (China), mainly over-the-counter
(OTC); there are also offshore markets, such as non-
deliverable forward instruments in the Chinese RMB.
The combined East Asian markets for these
instruments account for about 15 per cent of world
trading; (b) interest rate derivatives; (c) equity
derivatives, which have seen the most rapid growth,
mostly trading on the formalised exchanges;
(d) commodity derivatives and; (e) credit derivatives,
also growing very fast.
Therefore, derivatives markets are already important
in East Asia, though as can be seen in Table 2, they
are at present limited to a few jurisdictions, mainly
Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and China.
Foreign exchange derivatives, on which we will focus
our analysis below, as they seem to pose greatest
potential vulnerabilities, are currently traded in Korea
and Indonesia, though off-shore for currencies like
the Chinese RMB.
As pointed out, foreign exchange derivatives can
provide valuable risk-shifting at the microeconomic
level, from companies with net uncovered foreign
exchange positions usually to financial actors more
able to bear those risks. For example, companies
with foreign exchange debt, but local currency
revenues, can hedge their net foreign exchange
exposure via derivatives instruments, such as foreign
exchange forwards. This hedging is positive also at a
macroeconomic level because unhedged foreign
currency borrowing by firms can also reduce the
scope for monetary policy to manage the exchange
rate, e.g. when capital flows out of the country.
Allowing the exchange rate to decline hits the
balance sheets of the unhedged borrowers of
foreign currency; raising interest rates to support the
exchange rate damages borrowers in domestic
currency (Lowe and Stevens 2006). Reducing or
eliminating such mismatches – either by companies
borrowing less in foreign currency, using instruments
like GDP-linked bonds that reduce debt service in
bad times or by hedging their foreign debt service –
opens space for monetary policy to be more
expansionary in the face of contractionary shocks.
However, as discussed above, procyclical effects from
derivatives can result from ‘passive speculation’ when
large corporations (usually foreign investors) have net
foreign exchange exposure as they are not hedged; this
is because their income is in local currency (e.g.
telecoms or energy companies) but a large part of their
debt and other liabilities are in foreign currency. When
pressure on the currency to depreciate emerges, these
companies rapidly hedge their net foreign exchange
exposure and in a self-fulfilling way contribute to the
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depreciation of the currency. Derivatives here both
undermine the traditional hierarchy of volatility (which
assumes that foreign direct investment is more stable
than other flows) and seem to have a procyclical
impact on the exchange rate. Dodd and Griffith-Jones
(2006) provide econometric evidence that this occurred
in the case of Chile in 1998/9. There is also evidence
that similar effects have occurred in Brazil when
pressure on the currency emerged during 1999 and
2002. Regulatory measures could be taken to avoid
such passive speculation, for example, by ensuring that
large corporations with significant net foreign
exchange exposure are fully hedged when the
mismatches occur. This could have positive effects both
at the firm level – avoiding large losses –and
macroeconomically. But currently, such regulatory
measures seem not to be sufficiently adopted. A more
indirect approach is to increase capital or provisioning
requirements for banks lending to companies that have
unhedged net foreign exchange exposure, thus
increasing the cost of credit to those companies.
Several Latin American countries use this approach.
More open ‘active’ speculation occurs when
international hedge funds (HF) and investment banks
(IB) – normally based off-shore – speculate on
developing country currencies via the carry trade.
This seems to be increasingly widespread. A recent
example (see Dodd and Griffith-Jones 2006) is the
carry trade between the Chilean peso and the
Brazilian real; the basic idea of the strategy was to
capture the substantial differential between Chilean
and Brazilian interest rates as the latter are very high,
via use of derivatives assuming that these two
currencies are highly correlated, which they were for
a period. However, in 2005 when the peso started
to strengthen vis-à-vis the real (e.g. because the price
of copper shot up) HFs and IBs rapidly unwound
their positions and thus exacerbated further the
strengthening of the peso well beyond that
warranted by changes in fundamentals. The Central
Bank of Chile has produced econometric evidence of
this impact. Of course, the reverse phenomenon
would occur if there was downward pressure on a
currency. Such carry trade increasingly involves the
yen due to its low interest rate and is likely to be
significant in a number of East Asian economies.
Derivatives transactions take place off-shore. This
makes it difficult to control such transactions
through adopting national regulations only. Perhaps
the only effective national regulations for this
purpose used until now were the Malaysian controls
during the East Asian crisis, but this seems too
radical in more normal times. It would seem that
internationally coordinated regulation of this purely
speculative activity is clearly desirable (as well as of
actors like hedge funds), though this may be hard to
achieve in the short run. In the meantime, it may be
prudent for countries to avoid any capital account
liberalisation measures that may facilitate such off-
shore speculative activity.
Furthermore, it is important that countries have
regulations in place, to avoid that derivatives have
lower prudential standards than most traditional
banking and securities markets, which could cause
problems for financial systemic stability. This includes
fairly technical aspects – such as the availability of
sufficient collateral and capital requirements – which
can however be essential in times of stress.
3 Conclusions
The financial sector has been strengthened
significantly in East Asia; vulnerability to crises is
reduced by high reserves in most countries.
However, important old vulnerabilities remain,
especially in some countries.
New challenges are emerging, with the introduction of
Basel II and with the development of derivatives. These
pose potential new sources of procyclicality. On the
other hand, new opportunities arise, with the possibility
of issuing local currency and GDP-linked bonds that
would reduce countries’ vulnerability to crises further as
well a leave space for more sustained growth.
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Notes
* We are grateful for the financial support of DFID
for this article and conference. We very much
thank Masahiro Kawai and Barbara Stallings, and
other participants of the Bangkok Conference,
for valuable comments.
1 But it appears that the distance from the
minimum regulatory required also matters. Ediz
and Perraudin (1998) using information on UK
banks show that when banks are close to the
minimum capital requirements, they tend to
increase their capital adequacy ratios; moreover,
they change their asset portfolio composition
away from corporate credit.
2 China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, the Republic
of Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand.
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